Are the Lithuanians fearing a hybrid attack—or sending an indirect message to Russia?
Lithuania appears to be experiencing a historic moment in which the maps of the Baltic region may change dramatically.
In a move reminiscent of the closure of a modern-day “Iron Curtain,” the government has decided to “downscale” its relationship with neighboring Belarus—closing the last remaining open checkpoints and simultaneously declaring its airspace a potential target of a “hybrid attack.”
This measure is not merely about smuggling or border control—it is a statement, signaling a new, explosive phase on the geopolitical chessboard.
The timeline of the balloon crisis
On the evening of Monday, October 27, Lithuania closed its borders with Belarus.
This situation could last indefinitely.
The measures were triggered by meteorological balloons allegedly launched from Belarus.
Over the past week, these balloons have repeatedly disrupted operations at Vilnius Airport.
Lithuania has already closed its borders with Belarus several times in response, but the crossings were reopened shortly afterward.
This time, however, it seems that Vilnius intends to seal the border permanently.
The borders will remain closed at least until Wednesday, October 29, when the government is set to make its final decision.
According to Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė, the government has already prepared a resolution to shut down the Medininkai (Kameny Log) and Šalčininkai (Benyakoni) crossings — the last remaining border points between Lithuania and Belarus.
However, the Prime Minister noted that some exceptions will apply:
“This means that diplomats and diplomatic correspondence will still be able to travel, as well as our citizens and EU citizens coming to us from Belarus, but all other travel will be closed. In this way, we are sending a message to Belarus that we will not tolerate any hybrid attacks here and will take the strictest measures to prevent them.”
Could it all be about smuggling?
According to Lithuanian authorities, Belarusian smugglers use meteorological balloons to illegally transport cigarettes, alcohol, and other goods into the EU—products that sell well in European markets due to price differences.
This issue is far from new.
Lithuania accused Belarus of smuggling long before the current deterioration of bilateral relations, when the Belarusian–Lithuanian border was relatively porous. Lithuanian border guards conducted regular raids, uncovering cars, trucks, and even railway wagons carrying concealed contraband.
There were also frequent reports of makeshift “alcohol pipelines” stretching from Belarus into Lithuania.
Another issue was the so-called “gasoline tourism.”
Due to cheaper fuel prices, Lithuanians preferred to cross into Belarus to buy gasoline. Many vehicles were equipped with enlarged fuel tanks for resale purposes. This practice was particularly common among residents of border areas, who enjoyed visa-free access to neighboring regions.
Currently, Belarus maintains a unilateral visa-free regime for citizens of EU countries.
Notably, Lithuanians represent by far the largest group of visitors to Belarus, accounting for roughly half of all EU citizens entering the country.
Clearly, “economic tourism” is far from the only reason for this popularity—despite repeated warnings from Lithuanian authorities advising against travel to Belarus.
Or is it the migration issue?
However, the tightening of border controls that Lithuania initiated with Belarus after 2020 was not primarily about alcohol, cigarettes, or fuel smuggling.
Official Vilnius accused Minsk of orchestrating a channel for illegal migration.
This followed Belarus’ withdrawal from its readmission agreement with the EU in retaliation for European sanctions—and its refusal to take back illegal migrants entering the EU via Belarusian territory.
Poland has made similar accusations against Belarus, closing four out of six border crossings with the country in 2023.
Lithuania followed suit, leaving open only two out of six of its crossings.
Naturally, there is a broader military-political context behind all this—likely the decisive factor—while the fight against illegal migration and smuggling serves merely as a pretext.
Poland has also increased its military presence along the Belarusian border and is constructing additional fortifications in the border zone. Lithuania is taking similar measures.
Moreover, Lithuania and Latvia have recently proposed a rather exotic initiative: artificially flooding sections of their borders with Belarus.
This proposal is justified not only on military grounds but also under the guise of environmentalism—with Baltic governments claiming they aim to “restore” natural landscapes degraded by human activity.
Evidently, Vilnius and Riga hope to use this approach to secure EU funding for their project, as Brussels remains highly receptive to green initiatives.
Recent overflights, balloons, and transit toward Kaliningrad
Recently, Lithuanian authorities have increasingly accused Belarus of violating its airspace with drones.
For example, last summer, Lithuania spent several days searching for a drone allegedly originating from Belarus.
Later, debris resembling a Gerbera-type UAV was presented to the public.
Finally, the “icing on the cake” came with the hot-air balloons, which repeatedly disrupted operations at Vilnius Airport.
There is also another dimension to this turmoil along the Belarus–Lithuania border: the transit route toward Kaliningrad.
Closing all border crossings with Belarus effectively means cutting off all road access to the Kaliningrad region.
Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda also expressed support yesterday for restricting transit toward Kaliningrad.
Lithuania has frequently used its monopoly position as a transit country to exert pressure on Russia—and this is not solely a Vilnius initiative.
The EU views Kaliningrad as a sort of hostile enclave within its territory.
It is clear that serious contingency plans for isolating Kaliningrad are being considered in the event of military escalation.
In 2022, Lithuania already attempted to halt transit to Kaliningrad under the pretext of complying with EU sanctions—even though the goods in question were not being exported to the EU but merely transiting between Russian territories.
That crisis was eventually resolved, but Lithuania maintained certain restrictions on the types of goods allowed to pass through, the number of rail wagons permitted on Lithuanian railways, and other measures.
All of this has encouraged freight carriers to abandon Lithuanian routes and make greater use of maritime ferries.
However, this can hardly be called a viable solution, given the tense situation in the Baltic Sea—where European countries routinely carry out provocations aimed at obstructing Russian shipping.
What are the consequences? – EU transport breakdown – Chaos ahead
If Lithuania keeps its border with Belarus closed for an extended period, only three of the EU’s 14 border crossings with Belarus will remain operational—two in Poland and one in Latvia.
The main burden will fall on Poland’s border crossings, where long queues already form due to heavy workloads and delays at Polish customs.
Lithuania’s closure could lead to a total collapse of road transport.
It is worth recalling that Poland already attempted to completely shut down its border with Belarus during the Zapad 2025 military exercises.
However, those actions froze the “One Belt, One Road” corridor, and just a week later, Warsaw was forced to reopen the border under pressure from China.
Since Lithuania’s actions are unlikely to affect the rail freight corridor, Chinese intervention seems improbable this time.
The EU, which supports the policy of escalation, will also not restrain its “satellite.”
And, as recent experience shows, the problems of road hauliers—or ordinary citizens—hardly concern anyone.
All of this suggests that the European Union continues to pursue a course toward reducing its economic ties with Russia and Belarus, and consequently, toward a path of military-political confrontation.
www.bankingnews.gr
In a move reminiscent of the closure of a modern-day “Iron Curtain,” the government has decided to “downscale” its relationship with neighboring Belarus—closing the last remaining open checkpoints and simultaneously declaring its airspace a potential target of a “hybrid attack.”
This measure is not merely about smuggling or border control—it is a statement, signaling a new, explosive phase on the geopolitical chessboard.
The timeline of the balloon crisis
On the evening of Monday, October 27, Lithuania closed its borders with Belarus.
This situation could last indefinitely.
The measures were triggered by meteorological balloons allegedly launched from Belarus.
Over the past week, these balloons have repeatedly disrupted operations at Vilnius Airport.
Lithuania has already closed its borders with Belarus several times in response, but the crossings were reopened shortly afterward.
This time, however, it seems that Vilnius intends to seal the border permanently.
The borders will remain closed at least until Wednesday, October 29, when the government is set to make its final decision.
According to Prime Minister Inga Ruginienė, the government has already prepared a resolution to shut down the Medininkai (Kameny Log) and Šalčininkai (Benyakoni) crossings — the last remaining border points between Lithuania and Belarus.
However, the Prime Minister noted that some exceptions will apply:
“This means that diplomats and diplomatic correspondence will still be able to travel, as well as our citizens and EU citizens coming to us from Belarus, but all other travel will be closed. In this way, we are sending a message to Belarus that we will not tolerate any hybrid attacks here and will take the strictest measures to prevent them.”
Could it all be about smuggling?
According to Lithuanian authorities, Belarusian smugglers use meteorological balloons to illegally transport cigarettes, alcohol, and other goods into the EU—products that sell well in European markets due to price differences.
This issue is far from new.
Lithuania accused Belarus of smuggling long before the current deterioration of bilateral relations, when the Belarusian–Lithuanian border was relatively porous. Lithuanian border guards conducted regular raids, uncovering cars, trucks, and even railway wagons carrying concealed contraband.
There were also frequent reports of makeshift “alcohol pipelines” stretching from Belarus into Lithuania.
Another issue was the so-called “gasoline tourism.”
Due to cheaper fuel prices, Lithuanians preferred to cross into Belarus to buy gasoline. Many vehicles were equipped with enlarged fuel tanks for resale purposes. This practice was particularly common among residents of border areas, who enjoyed visa-free access to neighboring regions.
Currently, Belarus maintains a unilateral visa-free regime for citizens of EU countries.
Notably, Lithuanians represent by far the largest group of visitors to Belarus, accounting for roughly half of all EU citizens entering the country.
Clearly, “economic tourism” is far from the only reason for this popularity—despite repeated warnings from Lithuanian authorities advising against travel to Belarus.
Or is it the migration issue?
However, the tightening of border controls that Lithuania initiated with Belarus after 2020 was not primarily about alcohol, cigarettes, or fuel smuggling.
Official Vilnius accused Minsk of orchestrating a channel for illegal migration.
This followed Belarus’ withdrawal from its readmission agreement with the EU in retaliation for European sanctions—and its refusal to take back illegal migrants entering the EU via Belarusian territory.
Poland has made similar accusations against Belarus, closing four out of six border crossings with the country in 2023.
Lithuania followed suit, leaving open only two out of six of its crossings.
Naturally, there is a broader military-political context behind all this—likely the decisive factor—while the fight against illegal migration and smuggling serves merely as a pretext.
Poland has also increased its military presence along the Belarusian border and is constructing additional fortifications in the border zone. Lithuania is taking similar measures.
Moreover, Lithuania and Latvia have recently proposed a rather exotic initiative: artificially flooding sections of their borders with Belarus.
This proposal is justified not only on military grounds but also under the guise of environmentalism—with Baltic governments claiming they aim to “restore” natural landscapes degraded by human activity.
Evidently, Vilnius and Riga hope to use this approach to secure EU funding for their project, as Brussels remains highly receptive to green initiatives.
Recent overflights, balloons, and transit toward Kaliningrad
Recently, Lithuanian authorities have increasingly accused Belarus of violating its airspace with drones.
For example, last summer, Lithuania spent several days searching for a drone allegedly originating from Belarus.
Later, debris resembling a Gerbera-type UAV was presented to the public.
Finally, the “icing on the cake” came with the hot-air balloons, which repeatedly disrupted operations at Vilnius Airport.
There is also another dimension to this turmoil along the Belarus–Lithuania border: the transit route toward Kaliningrad.
Closing all border crossings with Belarus effectively means cutting off all road access to the Kaliningrad region.
Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda also expressed support yesterday for restricting transit toward Kaliningrad.
Lithuania has frequently used its monopoly position as a transit country to exert pressure on Russia—and this is not solely a Vilnius initiative.
The EU views Kaliningrad as a sort of hostile enclave within its territory.
It is clear that serious contingency plans for isolating Kaliningrad are being considered in the event of military escalation.
In 2022, Lithuania already attempted to halt transit to Kaliningrad under the pretext of complying with EU sanctions—even though the goods in question were not being exported to the EU but merely transiting between Russian territories.
That crisis was eventually resolved, but Lithuania maintained certain restrictions on the types of goods allowed to pass through, the number of rail wagons permitted on Lithuanian railways, and other measures.
All of this has encouraged freight carriers to abandon Lithuanian routes and make greater use of maritime ferries.
However, this can hardly be called a viable solution, given the tense situation in the Baltic Sea—where European countries routinely carry out provocations aimed at obstructing Russian shipping.
What are the consequences? – EU transport breakdown – Chaos ahead
If Lithuania keeps its border with Belarus closed for an extended period, only three of the EU’s 14 border crossings with Belarus will remain operational—two in Poland and one in Latvia.
The main burden will fall on Poland’s border crossings, where long queues already form due to heavy workloads and delays at Polish customs.
Lithuania’s closure could lead to a total collapse of road transport.
It is worth recalling that Poland already attempted to completely shut down its border with Belarus during the Zapad 2025 military exercises.
However, those actions froze the “One Belt, One Road” corridor, and just a week later, Warsaw was forced to reopen the border under pressure from China.
Since Lithuania’s actions are unlikely to affect the rail freight corridor, Chinese intervention seems improbable this time.
The EU, which supports the policy of escalation, will also not restrain its “satellite.”
And, as recent experience shows, the problems of road hauliers—or ordinary citizens—hardly concern anyone.
All of this suggests that the European Union continues to pursue a course toward reducing its economic ties with Russia and Belarus, and consequently, toward a path of military-political confrontation.
www.bankingnews.gr
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