A warning to the US that a harsh lesson awaits them following the attack on Larak Island is being issued by Iran, at a time when analysts rush to point out that it is highly likely the Americans could get trapped in another prolonged war of attrition, just as happened in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, as top American media outlets question why the US cannot disentangle itself from its wars, senior American generals and admirals present an extremely grim picture of the world's "strongest military," stating that the troops cannot endure any longer and that the conflict must stop as soon as possible.
At the same time, experts argue that the new military escalation by the US indicates that the sanctions strategy is not yielding results at the pace Washington would like, a fact that demonstrates the strategic deadlock facing President Trump. However, striking statements came from Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may praise Trump when speaking in English, but when speaking in Hebrew, he openly boasts that he deceived the US administration and dragged it into a war with Iran on behalf of Israel.
Gharibabadi (Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister): The US must learn a severe lesson
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi stated that "foreigners must be cut off" from the region following the American attack on Larak Island. According to Fars news agency, Gharibabadi noted that the US must "learn a severe lesson" so that it does not "repeat its aggressive actions."
Araghchi (Iranian Foreign Minister): Netanyahu says he deceived the US
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi launched a fierce attack against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, alleging deception against the US. "Netanyahu, when speaking in Hebrew, proudly states that he deceived the US administration and got it, on behalf of Israel, into a war with Iran. With laughter and a mocking tone, he openly explains how, through a thousand hours of presence in the media and on American television networks, he influenced public opinion and their policy. When he speaks in English, however, he praises the leadership abilities of the President of the United States," Araghchi stated in a post on social media.
New York Times: The US risks a new Afghanistan in Iran
The risk of Iran developing into a new Afghanistan is highlighted in an article by the New York Times. In an article titled "Why can't the US disentangle itself from its wars?", the New York Times argues: "Five years have passed since the end of the longest war of the United States in Afghanistan—a war that concluded with the chaotic withdrawal of American forces from Kabul, the storming of the airport by thousands of Afghans, and the death of 13 American service members in a suicide attack." However, since then, it has been proven that some of the concerns that prevented three American presidents from ending the war were unfounded. Afghanistan did not turn into a launchpad for terrorist attacks against the United States, while Al-Qaeda failed to re-emerge as a threat comparable to that of the past.
No quick victory
According to the New York Times, the US has become involved in a new war with Iran, while the prospects of a quick victory have dimmed. This raises a significant question: why is it so difficult for the United States to withdraw from a war, and is Washington getting trapped once again in the same cycle it experienced in Afghanistan? Greg Jaffe, a writer for the New York Times, comparing the war in Afghanistan with the war in Iran, argues that the problem for the United States is not simply about winning or losing on the battlefield. As he notes, the very political and military structure of the country makes it extremely difficult to accept defeat, retreat, and end a war.
Afghanistan: A war that was harder to end than to win
The New York Times writes that in most wars involving the United States since World War II, they faced the same problem: how could they disengage? Andrew Hoehn, a senior analyst at the RAND Corporation, notes that much of these wars were actually an effort to maintain the global order or defend American values, rather than conflicts threatening the very existence of the United States. In Afghanistan, one of the most significant opportunities for a US withdrawal presented itself after the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011. The leader of Al-Qaeda had been killed, the organization was dramatically weakened after a decade of American drone strikes, and the Taliban had proven that their complete defeat was nearly impossible. Nevertheless, the United States continued the war. Carter Malkasian, who served as an advisor to American commanders in Afghanistan, later wrote that if American officials knew then what was to follow, many of them—including himself—would have supported an earlier withdrawal. Such a decision, however, did not align with the dominant culture of the American military—an army trained to win and in which accepting defeat is exceptionally difficult.
The fear of defeat
After 2011, the issue was no longer just the defeat of the Taliban or the elimination of Al-Qaeda. American administrations were primarily concerned with Washington's prestige internationally, the fate of their Afghan allies, and the political cost of admitting defeat. Politicians also feared that a withdrawal from Afghanistan would be presented domestically within the United States as a personal failure and carry an electoral cost. During the same period, the Taliban had concluded that they did not need to defeat the United States militarily. It was enough simply to outlast them. As the number of US troops gradually decreased and public fatigue grew, the Taliban's goal transformed into a simple strategy: wait until the United States was no longer willing to pay the price of war. In Washington, goals shifted as well. As military victory receded further, politicians, instead of ending the war, attempted to minimize losses and costs while keeping the weak and unpopular Afghan government in power. Thus, the war continued without a clear prospect of victory.
The short war
Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of Defense of the United States, himself served in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has repeatedly criticized these conflicts as examples of American foreign policy missteps. At the start of the war with Iran, he promised that this conflict would bear no resemblance to the long wars of the past. Hegseth had emphasized that the war with Iran should be "targeted, lethal, fast, and decisive." He also insisted that "it is not Iraq" and that it would not turn into an "endless war." However, subsequent developments have thrown these promises under increasing doubt. Iran, responding to American attacks, closed the Strait of Hormuz, further complicating Washington's objectives. General Dan Caine, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted in Senate testimony that air and missile strikes are likely insufficient to defeat Iran or even reopen the Strait of Hormuz. As he stated, air power has clear limitations.
Toward a long-term war
At the same time, American military officials no longer speak with the same initial certainty about a swift end to the war. There is now talk of a campaign that could continue for months or even longer. When Hegseth was asked whether the Navy could sustain the blockade, he replied that the United States can do so "for as long as necessary" and even "indefinitely." This exact shift in rhetoric is what the New York Times warns about: a war intended to be limited and short could turn into an operation of attrition that, for political and military reasons, becomes harder to end with each passing day.
Iran and the Taliban: A crucial similarity
One of the most significant similarities between Afghanistan and Iran is that the adversary of the United States has a much stronger motivation to continue the war. The Taliban were fighting for their very survival and knew that the United States would eventually grow weary and leave. The leaders of Iran also view the war as a matter tied to their survival. However, there is a major difference: the importance of this war to Iran is not the same as its importance to the United States. For Iran, the issue may be tied to the survival of the political system itself. Conversely, for the United States, no comparable vital interests are at stake. For this reason, the cost of an American withdrawal would likely be much lower than the cost of continuing the war. The United States can walk away from the conflict. The question, however, is whether the president making such a decision is willing to accept the political cost.
Hormuz: The difficult equation
Reopening the Strait of Hormuz is not militarily impossible. Thomas Mahnken, a former senior Pentagon official, says that doing so is "feasible," but would likely require ground operations and a major military effort, as Iran has spent decades strengthening and fortifying its positions around this waterway. Washington is therefore faced with a difficult choice: is it willing to pay a higher human and economic price to achieve a specific objective, namely the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz? Or will it prefer to continue economic pressure and the blockade, thereby entering an even longer war? According to the New York Times, the answer at this moment is by no means clear. However, there is a major factor working against the continuation of the war: American public opinion. Polls show that many Americans oppose the war with Iran, and under current conditions, it does not appear that American society is prepared to bear the cost of a large-scale ground operation.
The warning
The final message is that the experience of Afghanistan should serve as a serious warning to American policymakers. The main danger is not necessarily that the United States might fail at some point to achieve its military objectives. The real danger is that, if complete victory is not achieved, instead of withdrawing, they might shift their goals and create new missions to justify maintaining a military presence. Afghanistan showed that wars can drag on for a long time even when their original purpose has ceased to exist. The key question for Washington is no longer just: "How do we defeat Iran?" Instead, it is: "If complete victory is not achievable, when and in what manner should the war be brought to an end?".
Washington is losing its patience
The escalation of hostilities between the US and Iran in recent hours shows that Washington is losing its patience with the slower strategy of sanctions, according to analysts. "Most of the war, from the beginning, has focused more on a tactical than a strategic level," said Ian Ralby, a maritime security expert and president of Auxilium Worldwide. "The question, therefore, is: why this, and why now?"
Sanctions are failing
The sanctions campaign may not be hitting Iran's leadership fast enough to satisfy the US, Ralby stated. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told Reuters on Sunday that he expects new sanctions against Iran every week, with a focus on banks, and that Washington intends to fully cut off institutions linked to Tehran from the dollar system. Ralby noted that "it is possible economic pressure was not constraining Iran's behavior to the degree the US expected." Renewed Iranian military activity may also have threatened American forces or interests in the region "at a severe enough level for the US to deem it necessary to strike Iranian territory once again." The American strike is likely an attempt to break the deadlock rather than a policy shift, Ralby added. "The status quo had become somewhat stagnant, and I am confident the US would like to see that situation change," he said. However, "the continuation of the blockade or the economic 'war' used to exert pressure on Iran" is unlikely to change.
Potential escalation
Trump's threat against Kharg Island is likely to remain at the level of rhetoric. The terminal has sustained dozens of strikes since the start of the war, but its oil infrastructure has been intentionally spared. "It is unlikely that the President of the United States will actually carry out the threat to attack Kharg," said Ralby, noting that the island also houses a historic early Christian church, which Iran has made efforts to preserve. An attack "would be a disaster for cultural heritage as well as critical oil infrastructure, which would likely cause catastrophic environmental damage," he said. "The threat may seem attractive, but the actual destruction of the island would yield hardly any benefit."
What Iran will do
Rather than confronting American forces directly, Iran is more likely to respond through allies and proxies, as well as by exerting pressure on shipping and energy flows. "The key to this conflict from the beginning has been asymmetry," Ralby said. "The Iranians have proven that they can, using limited actual force, inflict significant and real damage." For instance, the Houthis, who control large parts of Yemen and have exerted influence over access to Bab el-Mandeb for nearly a decade, entered the war a few weeks ago on Iran's side. As the Houthis restrict navigation through Bab el-Mandeb, the US and its regional allies may find themselves in a situation where the two most crucial sea passages, through which the majority of Persian Gulf oil products are exported, will be "subject to manipulation by Iran and its partners," said Michael Ratney, senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "We always assume the Houthis and Iran belong to the exact same group, but that is not the case," said Claudio Galimberti, chief economist at Rystad Energy. "In the past, they have acted quite independently." "Increased pressure on oil production, the energy market, and global shipping is likely to be the primary focus of the Iranian response," Ralby stated.
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