Washington is seeking a new way to overturn the balance of power in the western Pacific, this time setting its sights on the strongest symbol of Chinese naval power: aircraft carriers.
A new report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) proposes that the US adopt toward the Chinese fleet the exact same logic that Beijing has developed for years against American strike groups: submarines, long-range missiles, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, and a dense network of sensors and weapons.
The objective is not merely to render Chinese aircraft carriers vulnerable in the event of conflict, but to transform them into a strategic liability for Beijing starting already in peacetime.
Apply the same methods
CSIS, which is linked to the Pentagon, published the report «Flip the Script», literally «Upend the script», in which it is proposed to employ against large Chinese warships the same methods applied by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China to counter carrier strike groups of the US Navy.
Experts assess that the American fleet is not prepared for open confrontation with China.
Strong lead for China
The rapid expansion of the naval capabilities of Beijing is causing evident concern in Washington.
The PLA Navy has long surpassed the US Navy in terms of the number of ships and submarines, 370 against 295.
Concurrently, China leads significantly in the pace of shipbuilding for new units: from 2014 to 2023 it constructed 157, compared to 67 by the US.
Furthermore, the Chinese navy is much younger than the American fleet: up to 70% of its vessels were launched after 2010, whereas for the US the corresponding percentage is barely 25%.
Force of 9 aircraft carriers
The enhancement of the carrier capabilities of the Chinese fleet causes particular concern in Washington.
China currently possesses three active aircraft carriers, the «Fujian», «Shandong», and «Liaoning».
At the Pentagon, they project that by 2035 another six will be added, likely with nuclear propulsion systems.
Experts at CSIS point out that the PLA Navy is evolving into a potential tool of military coercion in the western Pacific.
The authors of the report recall that an aircraft carrier is not significant solely as a carrier of aircraft.
Strike group
It forms the hub of a carrier strike group, coordinating escort vessels, submarine forces, reconnaissance assets, and offensive strike weapon systems.
Such a group can project military presence, conduct operations far from its home bases, and threaten adversary sea lines of communication.
For Beijing, this means the capability to incrementally extend its presence beyond near seas, operating in the region of Taiwan and the South China Sea and, in the future, past the first island chain.
There is also a political dimension.
According to American analysts, the construction of such ships is tied to the ambition of China to cement its standing as a leading maritime power.
Aircraft carriers represent simultaneously a military instrument, an indicator of prestige, and a symbol of national strength.
Precisely this makes them politically vulnerable. The loss of a major aircraft carrier in combat would constitute a grave blow to state prestige.
Mirror logic
In a potential operation to seize Taiwan, aircraft carriers could naturally not replace land-based aviation, rocket forces, and the submarine fleet of the PLA.
However, they could augment overall naval power, offering cover to amphibious or surface assets and complicating the operational picture for the US and its allies, especially if supported by air forces from mainland China.
Geography is of decisive importance.
To enter the Philippine Sea, Chinese vessels must transit straits and maritime corridors between Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.
Americans believe these passages can be turned into robust defensive barriers, where carrier strike groups will remain under constant risk of detection and within range of anti-ship weapons.
Essentially, the Pentagon calculates that it can bottle up the PLA Navy within the sea areas closest to China.
This approach is based on so-called «mirror logic».
China has prepared for years to counter American aircraft carriers, deploying submarines, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, along with reconnaissance and targeting networks.
CSIS suggests that the US deploy against Chinese vessels an analogous combination of assets: covert tracking, long-range fires, distributed forces, and strikes on command-and-control architectures.
Ambush zone
As the primary instrument to counter Chinese aircraft carriers, American analysts favor submarine forces.
This refers principally to nuclear-powered multirole attack submarines, capable of covertly tailing a carrier strike group and striking it with torpedoes or missiles.
To these could be added conventional, diesel-electric submarines of allies like Australia, Japan, and South Korea.
This choice is viewed as logical, given that the US still significantly outmatches China regarding the quality of its undersea forces and its operational doctrine in employing them.
The goal of this strategy is not necessarily the immediate destruction of an aircraft carrier.
Equally essential is fostering perpetual uncertainty: Chinese operational leadership would have to assume that in any operational area, a hostile submarine might lurk nearby.
This would force it to allocate supplementary assets to escorts, anti-submarine aviation, sonar arrays, and the safeguarding of sea lanes.
Large number of submarines
There is, however, a constraint: generating a saturated «ambush zone» against multiple Chinese carrier groups would necessitate a massive fleet of submarines.
CSIS points out directly the shortfall in the industrial capacity of the American shipbuilding sector.
As a partial solution, it suggests wider integration of unmanned underwater vehicles and the basing of maritime drones in allied territories.
Anti-ship missiles
Another component of the concept entails deploying ground-launched anti-ship missiles across allied islands and bases, from Japan to the Philippines.
High-precision systems like PrSM and Typhon can dominate straits and access ways to the Philippine Sea, shaping zones where a major naval force would be forced to maneuver under heightened risk.
The aerial dimension encompasses aircraft-launched anti-ship missiles receiving fire-control solutions from satellites and other reconnaissance platforms.
Among the systems cited by CSIS are LRASM, SM-6, and the Naval Strike Missile.
No superweapon exists
The American perspective is grounded in the reality that success does not hinge on any single «superweapon», but on fusing missiles, intelligence, communications, air wings, and naval assets into a coherent kill web.
Particular emphasis is placed on electronic and cyber warfare, aiming to disrupt data sharing, command system operations, and targeting data dissemination across Chinese units.
An essential role is also earmarked for unmanned surface vessels, which, per the concept of the authors of the report, could threaten harbors, anchorages, and moored ships inside bases.
New fleet structure
To execute this operational concept, CSIS recommends overhauling the architecture of the fleet.
Instead of the earlier plan for 350 crewed ships and 150 unmanned surface and underwater vessels, a structure of 300 crewed and 300 unmanned platforms is recommended.
This shift captures the altered character of naval warfare.
Capital ships remain critical, yet they are far too costly and detectable for a military force to rely upon exclusively.
Drones, autonomous sensors, and mobile missile batteries facilitate force distribution, complicate enemy targeting, and permit achieving strategic results without risking the catastrophic loss of an exceptionally valuable capital ship.
Industrial alliance
The US is also counting on defense industrial cooperation with allies in the Indo-Pacific theater.
Without it, Washington would be incapable of sustaining an extended operational campaign.
Coproduction of precision munitions and naval drones, along with establishing forward stockpiles across the region, are judged indispensable components of the doctrine.
The overarching idea is a reversal of roles.
Rather than the US regarding its own aircraft carriers merely as exposed targets for Chinese missile and submarine wings, Washington aims to make Chinese carriers a vulnerability for Beijing itself.
This posture does not imply that Americans consider Chinese flattops easy targets.
To the contrary, it demands deep arsenals of precision ordnance, improved reconnaissance suites, an expanded submarine force, firmer allied coalitions, and resolving the crisis in the shipbuilding industrial base.
However, Chinese aircraft carriers are just as expensive, massive, and difficult to replace as American ones.
Consequently, the looming danger of their loss could act as a potent deterrent factor even prior to the outbreak of direct armed confrontation.
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