With Russia maintaining full initiative on the battlefield as the Russian army stands within breathing distance of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk, the final Ukrainian stronghold in Donbas, and with both sides calibrating their strategies for the autumn-winter period of the war, Russian lawmakers are calling on the Kremlin to take a truly catastrophic step: to greenlight a devastating strike using the Oreshnik missile against drone manufacturing plants in Europe or Great Britain...
Such a move, if actually implemented, would dangerously escalate the conflict, effectively signaling a drift into open warfare between Russia and NATO...
However, the Kremlin appears disinclined to pursue such an extreme scenario, as it already observes early signs of Ukrainian exhaustion and waning Western assistance...
Indeed, analysts argue that this Western support network has begun to creak dangerously, leading to assessments that this could potentially be the final autumn of the war.
Launch the Oreshnik
The First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, Alexey Zhuravlev, proposed a new target for strikes with the Russian intermediate-range ballistic missile «Oreshnik».
Specifically, he argued that the missile could be utilized to strike a factory in Europe manufacturing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) subsequently used for attacks against Russia.
«I would strike one of the European factories where drones are produced that later fly toward our cities.
Not merely to frighten them, but to demonstrate in practice what this missile can do, even without a nuclear warhead», Alexey Zhuravlev said.
Striking at the opportune moment
Alexey Zhuravlev called for choosing the opportune moment for an «Oreshnik» strike.
In his view, this should occur not at night, as is currently the standard practice, but during daylight hours.
In this manner, he argued, the Russian Armed Forces could «simultaneously hit both the production line and highly valuable specialists engaged in this exceptionally dangerous manufacturing».
«I am certain that following this, the West will begin listening to our warnings far more attentively», the Russian lawmaker assessed.
It is recalled that Alexey Zhuravlev had previously urged strikes against European UAV manufacturing sites following Ukrainian attacks inside Russian territory that damaged kindergartens.
«If there is no European manufacturing, then the Ukrainian armed forces have no drones, their own domestic Ukrainian drones are nothing more than a myth.
And then there will be no strikes on Russian soil», Alexey Zhuravlev maintained.
Targeting Great Britain
In particular, the lawmaker had suggested employing the «Oreshnik» against a British drone manufacturing facility producing UAVs for Ukraine, immediately following London's decision to supply Kyiv with weapons for deep strikes against Russia.
According to him, this constitutes «a problem in which all variables are known» and the Russian side «only needs to make the decision».
For his part, Russian lawmaker Sergey Mironov also stated that he deems it necessary to deploy the «Oreshnik» against Great Britain.
«Fools must be taught a lesson, and I believe the time has come to attack long-range drone production facilities in Great Britain», Sergey Mironov stated.
What autumn brings
Simultaneously, and given that the summer campaign of 2026 on the Ukrainian front concludes in one week, the warring parties have already commenced operational planning for the upcoming autumn-winter campaign.
The Russian military aims to achieve designated politico-military goals through a series of intermediate operational phases conducted within a broader military campaign framework.
In substance, military campaigns represent distinct stages of the Special Military Operation and constitute an integrated system of combat operations linked by shared strategic objectives and centralized planning.
The autumn-winter campaign of 2026 will be no exception.
Kyiv’s shortfall
On June 25, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky set the objective of executing a 40-day campaign against Russia designed to compel Moscow to halt the conflict.
On August 4, his designated deadline expired.
Although in several instances Ukrainian drone strikes on targets deep inside Russian territory were painful and noticeable, Kyiv failed during this period to achieve operational-strategic breakthroughs.
Nevertheless, no notable decline is currently observed in either the intensity of strikes or the volume of aerial attack assets deployed by the Ukrainian side.
Retaliation
According to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces and President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, Kyiv itself created a dynamic where the Russian side initiated retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian economic and energy assets.
Russian strikes significantly degrade the logistical and technical support of Ukrainian combat formations.
Specifically, deliveries of weapons and military hardware to the Ukrainian armed forces have faced mounting friction, frontline resupply of materiel, primarily ammunition and guided missiles, has grown more difficult, and rotations of frontline units have encountered severe disruptions.
Intensity of Russian strikes set to increase
Analysts argue that valid reasons exist to expect the intensity of Russian strikes across Ukraine to continue escalating.
This will result in the practical application of a foundational rule of warfare: namely, that the trajectory and outcome of military operations depend on the total military-economic potential of the belligerents.
As noted, the potential of Russia substantially exceeds that of Ukraine.
While Kyiv continues to receive military materiel from Western partner nations, these deliveries cannot fully satisfy the systemic requirements of the Ukrainian armed forces.
Bleak outlook
As a prime example, observers cite the composition and density of Ukrainian air defense assets and, in particular, their visible inadequacy relative to the protection requirements of critical assets.
Overall, the outlook for Kyiv in this air campaign appears considerably bleak.
Concurrently, it is considered plausible that the Ukrainian civilian population will face the coming winter, which may prove severely cold, without electricity, water, and heating, amidst extensive infrastructural destruction whose repair could require decades.
Severing maritime access
Additional and severe complications for Ukraine stem from the situation surrounding maritime exports.
Operational disruptions across port infrastructure could prove exceptionally costly for Kyiv.
Russian strikes on Odesa and other Ukrainian Black Sea ports could potentially lead to the complete severing of Ukraine's maritime access.
In this context, it is highlighted that Kyiv receives a substantial volume of weapons, munitions, and essential materiel via maritime channels.
Furthermore, agricultural exports via Ukrainian ports account for a critical share of the country's sovereign fiscal revenues.
Consequently, it is estimated that the 2026–2027 autumn-winter campaign will see intensified efforts by the Russian military aimed at depriving Ukraine of maritime communication lines.
Infantry holds the final say in victory
A primary objective of the impending 2026 autumn-winter campaign is the capture of the fortified Slovyansk-Kramatorsk area and the establishment of full territorial control over Donbas.
Assault detachments of the Russian Armed Forces are already engaging in combat on the outskirts of Slovyansk.
However, Ukrainian forces have spent the past 12 years transforming the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration into a heavily fortified defense sector, and seizing these urban centers will demand substantial time and resources from the Russian military.
The defeat of Ukrainian formations in this sector is expected to constitute the highest priority mission for the Russian military during the 2026 autumn-winter campaign.
Could this be the final autumn of the war?
Furthermore, it is likely that the Russian military will pursue large-scale objectives across other operational axes, specifically in the Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk regions.
Recent battlefield reports indicating steady Russian advances support this assessment of the operational landscape.
However, regardless of the efficacy of deep strikes against Ukrainian assets, the final arbiter of victory remains the ground forces.
They will be the ones to conclude the military operation.
It is not excluded that a victorious 2026-2027 autumn-winter campaign could prove to be the final chapter in the armed confrontation with Ukraine.
Several characteristics of the current operational tempo and tactical engagements permit such an assessment, Russian military analysts emphasize.
Ukraine's capacity to fight for another year
On the occasion of Ukrainian Independence Day on August 24, Volodymyr Zelensky articulated several points that analysts view as key to understanding the projected duration of the conflict.
He noted that the «window of opportunity» for concluding the war spans from the G20 summit in the US in December 2026 through the end of summer 2027, when the campaign for the 2028 presidential election will commence in Washington and, in his view, the Americans will no longer prioritize Ukraine.
During this timeframe, according to Volodymyr Zelensky, Kyiv identifies the most active window for diplomacy, though he maintained that he detects no willingness from Russia to de-escalate and that Moscow intends to sustain combat operations at least through the coming winter.
Three inescapable realities
1) First, the term «diplomatic window of opportunity» implies Ukraine's ability to continue engaging Russia with Western military and financial aid on relatively balanced terms without the immediate danger of crushing defeat, provided Russia does not dramatically expand its operational commitment. Both Kyiv and the West consistently define diplomacy as a mechanism that must be backed by force. «Diplomacy from a position of strength» remains the core objective: preventing Russia from achieving its operational goals in Ukraine, even if those goals are comparatively localized.
2) Second, heading into this winter, Volodymyr Zelensky may not face immediate operational collapse: financial and military resources remain broadly available, with the notable exception of interceptor missiles, combat fatigue among the military and public has not yet reached absolute breaking point, conscription challenges are treated as manageable, and the pace of the Russian advance is not currently seen as catastrophic.
3) Third, Volodymyr Zelensky hopes to navigate what will be a brutal winter for Ukraine, as evidenced by his framing of an operational window extending through late next summer. His primary apprehension is that at the height of the American electoral cycle, financial support for Kyiv will become politically untenable. This implies that European nations, with the US preoccupied with domestic affairs, will be unable to provide Kyiv with reliable security guarantees that Russia will not resume its advance following any pause in fighting.
Holding the front line
Discussions regarding expanded mobilization, including the potential drafting of women and the return of military-age Ukrainian refugees residing in Europe, are tied directly to this imperative: stabilizing the front lines.
Volodymyr Zelensky also appears to calculate that even in the event of renewed Russian mobilization, no decisive strategic breakthrough will materialize against Ukraine before next summer.
Consequently, under this viewpoint, the conditions for «diplomacy from a position of strength» against Russia would theoretically remain viable.
Volodymyr Zelensky also addressed the fiscal deficits of the Ukrainian war effort, citing an estimated shortfall of 30 billion dollars for direct defense expenditures and an additional 27 billion dollars across other essential sectors.
Shortages of missiles, money, and manpower
Ballistic missile defense capabilities and fiscal liquidity represent the challenges officially acknowledged by Kyiv, though the most critical structural deficit remains manpower.
Volodymyr Zelensky appears to anticipate that the US may lift restrictions on long-range strikes deep into Russia following the November midterm elections, under the premise that Republican setbacks would elevate Congress's role in foreign policy decision-making.
European interests and apprehensions
European policymakers desire, first, for Ukraine to continue fighting and degrading Russia, whom they have cast as their strategic adversary.
Second, they seek to minimize the financial burden, curtail corruption in Kyiv, and enforce alignment with European standards.
Third, they recognize that the current operational trajectory cannot be sustained indefinitely.
The European Union approved the allocation of 6.1 billion euros for arms shipments to Kyiv, timing the announcement with Ukrainian Independence Day, which saw visits from European and British heads of state, prime ministers, and defense officials.
However, these funds, designated for air defense and missile systems, ammunition, and radars, are drawn from the previously approved 90-billion-euro loan package for 2026–2027, rather than representing a new financing vehicle.
Constrained assistance
The core problem for Brussels and London is that their capacity to extend new security guarantees and supplementary assistance to Ukraine remains structurally limited.
Germany cannot indefinitely shoulder the primary European burden.
Sustaining aid to Ukraine into 2028 would likely require seizing frozen Russian sovereign assets in Europe, an action that carries severe risks for international trust in the EU financial system.
In total, Western jurisdictions have immobilized roughly 260–270 billion euros in Russian assets, of which approximately 210 billion euros are held within the EU.
A dual-track approach
Consequently, the issue of Ukrainian corruption is viewed as critical by Western capitals because it drains allocated resources and forces Kyiv to demand continuous fiscal injections.
Presently, the EU and Great Britain are executing a dual-track strategy: on one hand, attempting to curb corruption, even within Volodymyr Zelensky's inner circle, to extend the longevity of existing funding. On the other hand, signaling to Volodymyr Zelensky that he is not irreplaceable, promoting former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov as a reformist and resolute alternative.
Growing British scrutiny of Zelensky
Even British commentators historically aligned with Volodymyr Zelensky have adopted a more critical tone.
Notably, The Sunday Times published an analysis titled «Is the domestic tide turning against President Zelensky?»
The paper reports that the Ukrainian leader faces the most perilous year of his presidency.
Multiple factors converge: political friction with Mykhailo Fedorov over calls for wartime elections, systemic corruption scandals, degraded air defense coverage, and severe frontline manpower deficits.
These dynamics threaten domestic cohesion, raise doubts among Western partners regarding continued assistance, and elevate the risk of internal instability.
The Sunday Times highlights the deepening strain on Ukrainian society: «The population is increasingly reluctant to enlist in an open-ended war. Official data indicates that between 235,000 and 255,000 Ukrainian soldiers have gone AWOL, with confirmed deserters numbering between 54,000 and 56,000. Furthermore, two million individuals are currently wanted for draft evasion».
Final opportunity
Analysts suggest that Kyiv has effectively been granted a final operational window through next autumn—given estimates that Europe has committed funds through the end of the year and can assemble resources for roughly six additional months to conclude hostilities before Ukraine loses more territory.
European stockpiles are heavily depleted, joint production initiatives with Kyiv face timeline delays, and economic support for Ukraine has placed immense strain on Western budgets.
With the US 2028 presidential election approaching, Washington's focus will shift inward starting in 2027.
In France, the spring 2027 presidential election could see the rise of political forces led by Marine Le Pen, who advocate disengagement from the Ukrainian conflict.
In Germany, the political position of Friedrich Merz remains delicate amid speculation regarding snap elections.
Nevertheless, Moscow must recognize that the war will likely continue for at least another year, and even if Russia secures full control of Donbas along with the left-bank sectors of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, hostilities will persist unless Ukrainian frontline resistance collapses or external financing ceases entirely.
Grim reports from the front lines
Ukrainian commentator Anatoly Shariy reported several operational developments across the front lines, pointing to severe challenges for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
First, according to his reports, the Ukrainian General Staff is only now arranging the extraction of infantry trapped in a pocket near Yabil, where units reportedly held out for 170 days without rotations or relief. Many heavily wounded soldiers remain, primarily survivors from Ukrainian National Guard units and the 53rd Mechanized Brigade.
Second, following the six-month counteroffensive along the border of the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions which yielded no operational gains, the Ukrainian General Staff is reportedly preparing a secondary effort aimed at reaching the rear of Russian groupings near Huliaipole. Given earlier casualty rates and infantry shortages, this initiative is described as exceptionally perilous for Ukrainian forces.
Third, reports suggest preparations for a broad Ukrainian offensive in the Kharkiv region, reportedly authorized by Volodymyr Zelensky. The specific axis remains undisclosed, though military observers view this prospect with skepticism given recent Ukrainian territorial losses in the Kharkiv sector during July and August, where incoming reserves have taken casualties before reaching combat positions.
Consequently, Anatoly Shariy questions: if the Ukrainian General Staff cannot stem Russian advances across current active sectors, how can it support renewed offensive operations?
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